Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this

time.

I am rising in support of this resolution, although I do it with

great reluctance, because it is always difficult not to give the

benefit of the doubt to the executive in foreign policy. But 7 weeks

ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia

because I could discern no national interest in taking sides in a civil

war, no approach that would lead to a diminution of violence, and no

credible exit strategy.

I would like to stress, above all, one thing. Historical analogies

are extremely difficult to derive. I personally believe there are a

whole lot that apply in the Balkans, but many of them are

contradictory. One that the majority side in support of the war falls

back on is the Holocaust. I believe that there are Holocaustal

analogies. But I also believe that Milosevic is a sui generis war

criminal, one for whom Holocaustal acts are not unknown, but one where

leadership is more analogous to, say, a Ho Chi Minh or possibly even a

Pol Pot than to a Hitler.

I raise this because if we exclusively make Hitlerite analogies, we

have no choice whatsoever than to follow a kind strategy that could

lead in and of itself to greater losses of life to innocents than a

negotiated settlement.

With each decision, it appears that this administration and NATO are

moving into a circumstance where the problems are more difficult, not

less; more likely to lead to outrageously violent results. Now is the

time to stress negotiations, the time to recognize that we are not

likely to have a great victory.

Senator Aiken once suggested in Vietnam in the late 1960s that we

should declare victory and get out. That prescription does not fit the

Balkans, but I would urge that we put in place a process of

negotiations, and with that process recognize we have a greater chance

for a successful resolution than any other possibility.

Little is more difficult than to apply perspective to the events of

the day.

The Administration's Kosovo policy is open to question from two

contrasting perspectives: should we militarily engage the government of

Yugoslavia and, if so, what form should this engagement take? The first

question involves fundamental Constitutional issues on war powers and

the role of Congress in legitimizing military action and enhancing the

participation of the American people in decisions related to war and

peace. The second involves the unchallenged role of the President as

commander-in-chief and doctrines of warfare.

Seven weeks ago, I voted against authorizing U.S. intervention in

Yugoslavia because I could discern no national interest in taking sides

in a civil war in the Balkans, no approach that would lead to a

diminution of violence and no credible exit strategy.

The Administration, through its acts and statements, has broken with

the military doctrine of the last several Administrations, particularly

the Reaganite reliance on peace-time military preparedness and the Bush

espousal of the Powell Doctrine, which calls for the establishment and

enunciation of clear objectives with the use of overwhelming force to

achieve these objectives.

In this context, I recently reviewed a 1984 speech of the former

Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. Weinberger suggested that six

major tests should be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S.

combat forces abroad:

Americans are obligated to assess whether U.S. policy in Kosovo today

meet the above tests.

In terms of implementation the Grenada intervention--as minor an

issue as it may have been--and the Gulf War, which involved far greater

geo-economic stakes than the Kosovo conflict, stand in stark contrast

with the new Clinton military doctrine, which can be described as:

(1) Reliance on aircraft and missiles to rain destruction from

thousands of feet and in some cases hundreds of miles in such far-flung

parts of the globe as East Africa, Afghanistan and now Serbia. From an

American perspective this use of air power is star-wars like, but from

the perspective of targeted populations such as in Belgrade the effect

bears more resemblance to the bombings of World War II.

(2) The declared renunciation of the use of ground troops amounts to

the articulation that the United States intends to engage in Kosovo

with one hand tied behind its back.

(3) The determination that murderous potentates should be held in

check through the destruction of significant civilian as well as

military targets, including electric utilities, water systems,

political headquarters, TV stations and residencies of heads of states.

(4) The use of a defensive alliance for intervention in a civil war.

(5) Placing the prestige and might of the United States on the line

through the commitment of air power while multi-lateralizing the

decision-making and control in the NATO structure, which functions by

consensus.

The lessons of history have been widely invoked both to justify and

to decry our military intervention in Kosovo. Unfortunately history

does not provide easy answers, either with regard to the meaning of

contemporary events or to what actions should be taken in response to

them.

For instance, in the wake of World War I historians and political

scientists rightly concluded the European system had been too

inflexible in 1914. A misapplication of this lesson, however, led a

generation later to Munich. Too much rigidity precipitated the First

World War; too little backbone encouraged Hitler's aggression in the

Second.

World War II involved a conflagration between nation states; it also

involved a conflagration within--the Holocaust--and challenged

civilized society not to allow a replication of such inhumanity to man.

The background of both World Wars bears on American decision-making

today.

Clearly, the onslaught against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo that

Milosevic has unleashed has Holocaust parallels. On the other hand, the

ethnic cleansing the Serbs have undertaken also has analogs with what

Croats, Bosnians and, to a much lesser extent, Kosovars have attempted

in the region. Milosevic's barbarity would appear to lie somewhere

between Ho Chi Minh's assault on South Vietnamese Catholics and Pol

Pot's attempt to exterminate intellectuals.

The problem with equating Milosevic exclusively with Hitler, instead

of recognizing him as a sui generis war criminal, is that it makes a

negotiated settlement morally untenable and renders it impossible for

the U.S. to consider anything less than unconditional victory. This is

particularly dangerous when it is self-evident that a negotiated

settlement is preferable to all sides over a protracted conflict.

Hence, it is key to understand that at this point Kosovo is more a

civil war with holocaustal elements than vice-versa. But if the war

continues, a complicating factor for maintaining NATO unity in the face

of Serbian atrocities will in all likelihood be the West's ability to

stomach Kosovar counter-measures and the implications of ratcheting up

air power. The line between a terrorist and a nationalist freedom

fighter is narrow, as is the line between using force to stand up to

atrocity and applying force in such a way that greater violence is

precipitated.

Yet another lesson of history regards the effectiveness of air power

and strategic bombing. As John Kenneth Galbraith, who led a team that

assessed the impact of allied air power in World War II, has noted,

bombing in coordination with the use of ground troops has generally

proved effective, but strategic bombing of cities often causes

populaces to rally to domestic leadership, no matter how malevolent.

Here it must be noted that air power is different from what it was

earlier in the century. Our arsenal now includes nuclear weapons of

enormous destructive power as well as so-called smart bombs and

missiles that can strike with surgical accuracy, which greatly enhances

our ability to limit danger to our armed forces and collateral damage

to civilian areas.

The development of smart weapons, however, may have caused political

leaders to be too tempted to use them without recognizing that the use

of force anywhere at any time has ramifications which are not easily

predictable and which not infrequently are counter-productive.

For instance, our goal in using force against Milosevic may be to

undermine his political support, but it would appear that, to date, we

have ensconced his political strength while weakening the democracy

movement, which was profoundly pro-American in Serbia and damaging the

lives and livelihoods of ordinary Serbs.

Much of the world is not enamored of America's ability to rain

destruction from afar. We simply have no idea how deep and how long the

effects of our air strikes and the targets we have chosen will last.

What we do know is that Serbs point to a 14th century defeat as a

rallying cry for their actions today. What we do know is that the

Armenians believe that in 1919 they suffered the first holocaust of the

century and Turkish embassies to this day are susceptible to terrorist

attacks because of the atrocities of the now defunct Ottoman Empire.

In the background of the predicament we are in is failed diplomacy.

Where Theodore Roosevelt invoked a doctrine of ``speak softly, but

carry a big stick,'' this Administration has propounded a policy of

threatening vigorously while refusing to make timely military

deployments that might have averted conflict. We have been backed into

using air power, not out of considerations of national interest but to

ensure that the credibility of U.S. political leadership was kept in

tact. We told Milosevic we would use it if he did not agree to our

preferred negotiating plan and he in effect called our hand.

In the background was a peace agreement which had the doubtful

support of one side and no support from the more powerful party.

While the Rambouillet accord might have met standards of American

sensibility, it clearly proved untenable for the activist parties in

the region. This fact should give pause to NATO, America in particular.

In this regard I have become increasingly Frostian in my geopolitics.

Good fences sometimes make good, or at least better, neighbors. It

would appear that, despite the multi-heritage example of Sarajevo, the

people of the Balkans will have to learn to live apart without war

before they can live together in peace.

A century and three-quarters ago, an American President, James

Monroe, asserted a doctrine that carries his name which established

that the United States would object to further European colonization in

this hemisphere and give succor to independence movements in Latin

America. Implicit in the Monroe Doctrine was the assumption, growing

from the concerns of our first President, George Washington, a military

man, that the United States should not become entangled in the quarrels

of Europe.

With the exception of two World Wars in this century and a commitment

made in the context of the Cold War of a defensive alliance, historical

U.S. foreign policy has been governed by the precept that we would give

umbrella protection to independence movements in the Americas but

refrain from military intervention in the internal affairs of nation

states on the continent. Our country was formed by dissidents and

opportunity seekers reacting to the repression and civil wars in

Europe. It now appears that our fore fathers better understood the

Balkans and like European problems than the State Department does

today.

At this point we are being asked to support NATO action for the sake

of the viability and credibility of the alliance, rather than for the

purposes for which the alliance was formed. We appear to be putting the

alliance ahead of our objectives and allowing our mutual strategy to

test the alliance itself, which it is doing. One poll has found that 95

percent of Greeks object to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and there

are significant percentages, albeit smaller, opposed in every country

of the alliance, including the United States.

A decade or so ago, I participated in a forum at the Library of

Congress with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at which I

asked him about an observation he made in one of his autobiographical

works. Kissinger had written that between the 1968 election and the

inauguration, he had sat down with President-elect Nixon and the two of

them had decided to get the United States out of Vietnam. I asked why

they had not just gone ahead and done that immediately upon taking

office and Kissinger responded, ``Congressman, we meant we would get

out with honor.'' Asked if that meant further escalation of troop

numbers and bombing, Kissinger responded, ``Absolutely.''

It is my sense that NATO is in a similar position today with regard

to Belgrade. For the honor of NATO, it appears that we are about to

escalate the war. The question is whether we are not better off seeking

the earliest possible settlement.

History is a source of lessons and perspectives, but issues of the

moment must also be approached in a manner which calculates their

future implications.

NATO's strategic rationale appears to have broken down on the issue

of numbers. There are 19 states versus one with that one being much

smaller than most of the 19. But another way of looking at this

strategic conundrum is that 19 countries are allied against the forces

of nationalism and sub-nationalism in a part of the world where

historical and ethnic tensions provide little basis for compromise.

Nationalism led to dramatic changes in the world's map in the 19th

century and has been repeatedly underestimated as a force in the 20th

century. The question is will NATO, despite its might, find itself in

the same position in the Balkans as the United States did in Vietnam

and as the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan?

Returning to history, the first great chronicle of the Western World

relates to a land mass adjoining the Balkans, ancient Greece.

Thucydides wrote that early in the Peloponnesian Wars which pitted the

quasi-democratic and enormously uplifting culture of ancient Athens

against the more militaristic Sparta, the Athenian Assembly voted to

send a naval fleet to conquer the neutral island of Melos. Several days

later the decision was reconsidered and a faster ship was sent to

overtake the fleet and call off the invasion.

Later in the war, however, the Athenian Assembly again decided to

invade Melos and sent out a force which killed all the men and enslaved

the women on the island. Thucydides' chronicles were intended to show

how the world's most civilized city-state at the time had lost its way,

and indeed from that point on Athens never again recovered its prior

status.

An aspect of the bombing today is what targets are left in Serbia

after so much damage has already been inflicted. Clearly at this point,

the Serbs have lost virtually everything except the war, while the West

has won nothing, particularly a peace.

A case can be made that whatever mistakes have been made to date, it

is morally questionable to stand by and do nothing and an even greater

mistake to pull the rug out from under the executive branch. The reason

I cannot support America's continuing military role is that each of the

choices for NATO in the future gets more untenable. There is the

prospect of sending in troops with losses potentially equivalent to or

greater than Vietnam. There is also the prospect of ratcheting up the

air war. One can always strike again at military sites, but it appears

that on the civilian side, Yugoslavia has already been bombed back to

the 18th century.

Military historians counsel two principles when devising strategic

doctrine: put on the shoes of opponents and do not back them hopelessly

into a corner. In the case of Kosovo, we clearly have not put on the

shoes of the Serbs and we have done everything to back Milosevic into a

corner. We have made a martyr out of a murderer and allowed a war

criminal to stand up to NATO, which includes Serbia's ancient enemy,

Turkey. Milosevic's martyrdom increases with each degree of the

suffering of his people.

Every society has an historian or philosopher who points out that the

road to Hell is paved with good intentions. Despite the good intentions

of the West, our policies appear to be counterproductive. Ratcheting up

the war

could well signify a ratcheting-down of the moral high ground of NATO.

The prerequisite of policy must always be good intentions, but good

intentions are insufficient grounds for action. Policy must match

intentions with practical capacities to carry out defined objectives.

Just War doctrines, after all, require that responses be proportional

and effective. The only alternatives to a bombs only policy are the

introduction of ground troops or the isolation of Serbia, the reliance

on a humanitarian response to a humanitarian crisis. In either case the

legal and moral imperative to indict Serb leadership for war crimes is

overwhelming.

In the late 1960s Senator Aiken suggested we simply declare victory

and get out of Vietnam. This prescription does not fit today's dilemma

in the Balkans, but our first obligation should be to put in place a

process of negotiations with the understanding that an imperfectly

negotiated settlement may be the closest thing to victory that is

likely to be possible without the loss of an incalculable number of

innocents.

Escalating the war, on the other hand, puts U.S. interests at risk,

in the Balkans and in other parts of the world. The earlier we

reconsider the better.

The vote on this resolution and the others we will take today are

necessitated by law. That law, the War Powers Resolution, may be

unconstitutional and today's votes may serve as a basis for the courts

to rule to this effect. Nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution is at

this moment the law of the land. Ironically, we are finding, compliance

may be more difficult for the legislative than, as has generally been

perceived, for the executive branch because it forces congressional

accountability for or against executive actions.

More importantly, the timing as well as the fact of consideration of

these resolutions is awkward for the national interest because

legislative decision-making is required by dates certain--i.e., within

a prescribed period from the time troops are deployed in hostile

circumstances.

The public interest may not be well served by such a review of

executive action in such a timeframe, but it would be less well served

if Congress avoided its legal and constitutional responsibilities.

Hence, what in effect is a legislative/executive confrontation is

legally, at this time, unavoidable, and as an individual Member of

Congress I have no option except to take a stand. This stand is one of

dissent to what I consider to be a foreign policy that lacks

intellectual rigor and misserves the national interest.